Exercises
| Exercise | Avg. Time | Difficulty | Solved by | Tier | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
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Pentest Process: Testing Different Target Types | 12 | PRO | ||
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Pentest Process: Kickoff & Setup | 15 | PRO | ||
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Pentest Process: Scoping | 15 | PRO | ||
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Pentest Process: Introduction | 19 | PRO | ||
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Pentest Process: Communication During the Engagement | 11 | PRO | ||
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Pentest Process: Methodology & Coverage | 12 | PRO | ||
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Pentest Process: Rules of Engagement & Authorization | 14 | PRO | ||
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Pentest Process: Notes & Evidence | 10 | PRO | ||
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Pentest Process: Choosing the Right Engagement | 17 | PRO | ||
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Java Serialize 11
This challenge covers building the Groovy1 gadget chain to reach remote code execution using only existing library classes.
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9 | PRO | ||
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Java Serialize 12
This challenge covers wrapping a payload in a SignedObject to bypass signature-based validation before deserialization.
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9 | PRO | ||
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Output Blocklist
The model will freely tell you the key, but a server-side output filter scans every response before it reaches you. Any response containing the key is blocked. You need to get the model to reveal the key in a form the filter does not catch.
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11 | PRO | ||
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Input Blocklist
A server-side input filter inspects every message before it reaches the AI model. Messages containing certain blocked keywords are rejected and never forwarded. If your message makes it past the filter, the model will answer freely.
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12 | PRO | ||
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Secure Design: Rendering Untrusted Content on a Throwaway Origin | 21 | PRO | ||
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Secure Design: Event Publishing & Data Boundaries | 21 | PRO | ||
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Secure Design: Idempotency Keys | 20 | PRO | ||
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Secure Design: OAuth / SSO Integration | 28 | PRO | ||
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Secure Design: Write-only API Keys | 23 | PRO | ||
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Secure Design: Sandboxing Code Execution | 23 | PRO | ||
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Secure Design: Session Management | 29 | PRO | ||
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Secure Design: Password Reset Flow | 28 | PRO | ||
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Java Serialize 09
This challenge covers exploiting toString() through a wrapper class, the technique behind BadAttributeValueExpException in Commons Collections.
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14 | PRO | ||
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Java Serialize 10
This challenge covers chaining multiple classes together into a multi-class gadget chain, bridging single-class exploits to real-world attacks.
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13 | PRO | ||
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Java Serialize 08
This challenge covers exploiting Object.equals(), triggered during HashSet and HashMap deserialization, as a gadget entry point.
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15 | PRO | ||
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Java Serialize 07
This challenge covers using readResolve() as a deserialization entry point to trigger a gadget chain after the object is restored.
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14 | PRO | ||
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Secure Design: Error Proofing (Poka-yoke) | 31 | PRO | ||
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Secure Design: CI/CD Pipeline | 34 | PRO | ||
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Secure Design: Framework Security Evaluation | 31 | PRO | ||
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Secure Design: Password Storage & Hashing | 34 | PRO | ||
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Secure Design: Fail Closed | 31 | PRO |
Showing 1–30 of 821 exercises
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